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ABSTRACT 
The Swedish Public Transport Association (SPTA) has taken initiatives to develop contract 
recommendations on incentives for increased patronage in tendered contracts. There is, 
however, currently a small evidence-base for recommendations for how public transport 
contracts should be designed to provide incentives to achieve the policy goals of the 
Regional Public Transport Authorities (RPTA). A review of public contracts from the 
government agency Transport analysis (2015) indicates that the use of patronage incentives 
so far is modest. The purpose of this study is to take first steps towards creating such a 
knowledge base by collecting and analyzing the performance in four bus contracts in 
Stockholm county spanning seven years. The study focusses on a new kind of contract 
called E20 where 100 percent of the payments to operators are tied to the number of 
boarding and paying passengers. The study compares the development of the E20-contract 
areas (formerly independent contracts) with the outcomes in same contract areas before and 
with two comparison areas covered by gross cost contracts. 
 
The stated goals for the E20 contracts are to increase patronage and customer satisfaction 
as well as to increase efficiency. With the use of available monthly outcome data, the 
outcomes in the E20 areas (three years) are compared with the period before (four years) 
and to how the comparison contracts using gross cost contracts have developed: 
• In two of the E20 contract areas (Sollentuna and Norrort) the operator tried to 
significantly increase the supply, without this leading to substantial increases in 
boardings. Thereafter, the supply was reduced to a level slightly above the level before 
the E20 contract started. In the other two E20-contract areas, supply has increased 
gradually but little. 
• In two other E20 contract areas (Bromma and Norrort) the share of canceled departures 
decreased, while they increased in (Sollentuna, Solna/Sundbyberg). These effects are 
small. 
• Cancelled departures have decreased more in E20 areas than in the comparison areas. 
• Punctuality has changed little in the E20 contract areas. 
• Perceived quality deteriorates initially but improved steadily to roughly recover to 
previous levels. 
• Costs have declined in two contract areas (Bromma and Sollentuna) but increased in 
two other (Solna/Sundbyberg and Norrort). On average, they increase slightly, but less 
                                                          
1 This paper is a condensed version of a report in Swedish. 
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than in the comparison contracts. 
 
Compared to the gross cost contracts in comparison areas, the operator of the E20 contracts 
performed better regarding in the dimensions of  
Costs, Customer satisfaction (initially worse but then better), Punctuality, Cancelled 
departures 
..but inferior in Supply of number of departures 
... and not better regarding the number of boarding passengers. 
 
Note that this describes the outcome with available data, in this specific case during this 
specific period. This single observation does not provide sufficient basis for generalization to 
other contracts or continuing events of the same contract. Neither does it exclude that a 
similar course of events could occur later or in other contracts. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s when tendering for public transport procurement 
commenced, gross cost contracts (a fixed payment for running a timetable) have dominated. 
Such contracts mean that the regional public transport authority (RPTA) plans the traffic, 
keeps ticket income and pays the operator. Often there are elements of bonuses and fines. 
However, the payments for these usually constitute a small part of the contract payments. 
Already in the 1990s, RPTA’s tried various forms of incentive contracts in order to incentivize 
increased patronage. In recent years, the proportion of such incentive contracts has 
increased. According to Hultén (2015), Sweden uses three types of incentive contracts: (1) 
Gross cost contracts with some quality incentives, (2) Gross cost contract augmented with a 
minor proportion per boarding passenger and (3) 100 per cent payment in the form of an 
incentive per boarding passenger (p.19). The E20 contracts are examples of the latter and 
were the Stockholm County Council's first contracts where the payments are based entirely 
on the number of passengers with valid tickets boarding.  
The level of incentives and what the incentives are expected to affect vary between the 
contracts. According to the Transport analysis (Trafikanalys, 2015) contract database for 
2013, 52 percent of all regional public transport authorities' bus service contracts had no 
incentive at all. An additional 10 percent had only incentives that did not involve travel, for 
example for customer satisfaction or punctuality. Contracts with less than 25 percent travel 
incentives accounted for 26 percent of the total number of contracts while 12 percent of the 
contracts had travel incentives with more than 25 percent of contract payments.  
It is not clear that there is a strong link between the goals the public transport authorities 
want to achieve and how the design the incentive contract is chosen. Transport analysis 
(2015) state that Swedish public transport issued guidelines which recommended that the 
variable part of the payment (incentive part) should consist of compensation per registered 
passenger of at least 25 percent of the total compensation. It was agreed that this proportion 
of incentives was necessary to have a real impact on increasing travel (Trafikanalys, 2015, p. 
33). Apart from these recommendations, we do not know any further examples of 
recommendations or analyzes that underlie the contractual structure.  
The purpose of this study is to compare the outcomes after the start of the E20 contract in its 
four contract areas with the outcome before, and the outcome before and after in two 
comparison contracts, the E13 contracts: Södertälje and Järfälla Upplands-Bro. This 
comparison is made using data from 2009 to 2015. The E20 contract areas Bromma 
(Stockholm Västerort), Solna/Sundbyberg and Sollentuna started on August 20 in 2012, and 
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the contract area Norrort (Täby, Åkersberga and Vaxholm) started January the 7th 2013 The 
contract covers both bus and rail traffic, but this project only analyzes bus traffic.  
The E20 contracts set the following goals: "The overall goal of the contract is to increase the 
number of passengers and increase public transport's market share in the contract area, 
drive and develop bus and rail traffic that provides more and more satisfied passengers, plan 
traffic to make it more efficient. In addition, the traffic operator must ensure the fulfillment of 
the Stockholm region RPTA requirements regarding traffic safety, that the traffic is performed 
without interruptions and disturbances, make sure that revenues are generated, and manage 
and maintain SL's property and infrastructure to ensure that the value and status are 
maintained during the contract period." (Stockholm region RPTA SLL, 2014a). In addition to 
the payment to that the E20 contract operator is payed per by boarding passenger with valid 
ticket, incentives are linked to quality in terms of fines. Fines are paid for: 
• Cancelled departures (a sum for each departure that constitutes a "Cancelled 
departures")  
• If the proportion of punctual departures is less than 91 per cent in the first part or 92 
per cent in the second part an additional fine is paid-on for each additional 
percentage of failure in punctuality.  
• If the Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI) level is less than 65 percent in both parts of 
the contract (63 percent in the first 24 months in the first part), an additional fine for 
each additional percentage unit in THE CSI.  
In addition to these fines, further fines may be levied for shortcomings in according to the 
Stockholm region travel guarantee, vehicle-related shortcomings and other quality 
requirements which are not considered in this study.  
In the comparative areas, Södertälje and Järfälla Upplands-Bro, gross cost contracts apply 
where the operator receives a basic compensation based on a certain number of supply 
kilometers per year. If the RPTA orders (or cancels) traffic, this increases (decreases) the 
compensation according to a price per supply kilometer and hour. It is also predetermined 
what compensation the operator will receive if it needs to acquire new buses.  
However, there are elements of incentives also for the comparison areas. Limit levels are set 
for punctuality (delay minutes / boarding passengers), performed traffic (delay minutes / 
boarding passengers for missed departures), vehicle condition and securing of revenue 
(ticket control). If the operator reaches a better level than the limit, bonus will be awarded, 
and if a lower level, the fine is demanded. 
  
2 Data 
For this study data from the Stockholm region RPTA were received. The variables used in 
the study are the number of departures, punctuality, the number of completed and canceled 
departures, an index for customer satisfaction, the contract payments and an estimate of the 
number of boarding passengers on weekdays based on a sample of boarding counts. The 
observations are monthly and refer to a total of six contract areas for seven years. There are 
thus 504 observations of contract outcomes.  
For the number of boarding passengers there are data for weekdays. We asked for the total 
number of boarding passengers, the number of boarding per route and frequencies, new 
route outlines, vehicle requirements and which vehicle classes are actually used, but such 
data was not available. There are some notations on route changes and there have been few 
such changes of significance during the contract period. Changes in supply have mainly 
taken place in terms of changing frequency. Both change of route outlines and speed are 
briefly described in the Traffic Committee's (Trafiknämnden) reports on traffic changes.  
However, we do not have any information about any changes that occur during the year.  
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The supply data is in the form of number of departures. The main categories can be divided 
into scheduled traffic and cancellations. Actual traffic is calculated by subtracting removing 
the canceled departures from planned departures.  
For demand (Table 1), the data used is the number of boardings on weekdays. Such data 
are available on a monthly basis throughout the period studied. This data is measured by 
means of automatic passenger counts (ATR) which is a measure of the number of boarding 
on a sample (tenth) of the departures. Data are processed by a consultancy firm and 
delivered to the RPTA. The figures are given in thousands and are thus estimates. When the 
E20 contracts started, the intention was to base the compensation to the operator on actual 
verifications by each passenger verifying the Access Card on the bus. The system, however, 
had some teething problems, which is why ATR data are used.  
It is somewhat problematic for the analysis that we only have work day daily travel and not 
the total number of passengers per month as the compensation is based on the total number 
of boardings. With total boardings a comparison could have been made between total 
boardings and the billed amount. For the E20 contract areas there are thus number of 
boardings per month;  for the first part available from August 2012 and for the second part 
available from January 2013. We have no information about how these have been estimated 
from the ATR numbers.  For the E13 bus areas, this variable is not available.  
 
Table 1 Data on demand.  All data is per bus area. 
Boardings  
 
 
 
Key ratios that provide a monthly average for the number of 
boarding per day, is measured by ATR. Available for the entire 
period studied. 
 
Boardings average 
per weekday  
 
 
Monthly averages for the number of boardings per workday, are 
measured by validations provided by the validation system.  
Available for the period September 2014-December 2015.  
 
Boardings average 
per month  Estimated total number of passengers per month.  
 
To measure quality, we have access to data on the timeliness, cancelled departures and the 
Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI) presented in Table 2. For punctuality, we have the 
percentage of timely departures and arrivals. For cancelled departures, these data are 
available as mentioned above. Customer satisfaction comes from the Quality Survey 
conducted on board the vehicles to approximately 5,000 people each month. For the CSI, we 
have three variables: overall satisfaction, driving style and driver behavior. Passengers have 
answered questions as to how satisfied they are (Are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor 
satisfied or satisfied) regarding the three categories. We have chosen to focus on the 
proportion of satisfied passengers. 
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Table 2 Quality data.  All data is per bus area. 
Punctuality  
 
 
Departures on 
time  
 
Percentage of punctual departures. Punctual departure 
is defined as a departure within the interval of 1 minute 
to +3 minutes compared with the timetable.  
 
 Arrivals on time  
 
 
Percentage of punctual arrivals.  Punctual arrival is 
defined as an arrival within the interval of 1 minute to 
+3 minutes compared with the timetable.  
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Index 
Summary 
ratings  
 
The proportion of passengers who indicate that they 
are overall satisfied with the trip.  
 
 
Rating driving 
style  
The proportion of passengers who are satisfied with 
the driving style.  
 
Rating response 
  
The proportion of passengers who are satisfied with 
the response.  
 
In addition to supply, demand and quality data, we also have access to the RPTA’s 
contractual payments. These are made on a monthly basis and should, according to the 
principle of paying per passenger with a valid ticket, follow the number of boarding 
passengers. It should be mentioned that this is not the case, due to the fact that the monthly 
invoicing is based on a forecasted number of passengers with valid tickets. This amount is 
later adjusted according to the outcome of the number of boardings. Thus, there is a lag in 
the billing. Other variations may occur as contract payments and may also be influenced by 
fines, which are regulated monthly.  
Finally, we want to make a qualification about the reliability of the data regarding 
Solna/Sundbyberg and Sollentuna. According to information provided by officials at the 
Stockholm region RPTA at our first presentation, it is not certain that all departures reported 
to Solna/Sundbyberg and Sollentuna pertain to these areas. Departures may sometimes 
have been attributed to a false contract because both contract areas are based at the same 
depot (Lunda).  
 
3 Theory and method  
A point of reference for the assessment of developments may be the supply of services at a 
certain time, such as the supply of routes, departures, prices, passengers, etc. Another point 
of reference could be an estimated potential for socially optimal supply given social costs, for 
increasing passengers and community benefit. The latter approach requires information on 
bus traffic's potential to attract new passengers through improvements in supply as well as 
the value of the improvements that can be achieved through, for example, frequencies or 
short-term travel times (for example, public transport lanes and signal prioritization).  
However, the latter approach would require some operationalization of optimality. For this 
purpose, we define three kinds of optimality with increasing ambitions to cover different 
consequences.  
In Pyddoke and Wretstrand (2016) research on social optimization of urban and public 
transport is surveyed. These papers analyze the optimization of instruments for handling city 
traffic, road congestion and public transport. If a socially optimal supply (routes, frequencies, 
prices, passengers) can be calculated, the optimal supply could be approached by optimal 
incentive contracts. An optimal incentive contract could be defined as an contract that 
generates prices and travel as close to any of the optima as defined above under the 
restriction that the operator chooses that which is a profit maximizing supply. This means that 
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the contract should be such that the operator chooses the welfare-optimizing offer as a profit-
maximizing offer.  
Without defining what the goal is and what optimality is, it is not possible, from a welfare 
economic perspective, to comment on the direction in which the number of boardings, etc., 
should develop. Initially, the number of boardings can be both too large or too small. 
However, it is important to remember that traffic in urban areas is associated with welfare 
gains that are not realized if the operator strives to cover costs with revenue. Too much focus 
on ticket revenue is therefore likely to lead to too below socially optimal supply.  
Previous studies of incentives (Bekken and Norheim, 2006; Pyddoke and Andersson, 2010) 
indicate that the socially optimal payments per boarding passengers may have to be at least 
exceed the double of the ticket price to give the operator incentives to increase supply. 
However, at the time of writing this paper, there are no recent calculations of incentives to 
achieve optimal public transport.  
Another type of result can say something about the form of incentives. In Nilsson et al. 
(2016), a theoretical incentive is studied to give an operator incentives to maximize the social 
welfare. This incentive weighs the benefits from ticket revenues, the number of trips and the 
benefits of higher frequencies in terms of less waiting time. This means that a subsidy is 
linked to both the number of boradings and the number of departures or bus kilometers.  
The present follow-up study is thus done without knowledge of whether an optimal supply 
would mean an increase or decrease in supply or a change in tariffs. Instead, we have 
chosen to use the stated objectives of the E20 contract and for Stockholm's ”Traffic supply 
program” (Trafikförsörjningsprogram) in 2012 (Trafiknämnden, 2012) as the political goal. 
The contract points to the goals of increased travel, increasing the proportion of satisfied 
passengers and increased efficiency. In the Traffic supply program, the target image is more 
composite, but all the above purposes are included.  
We have therefore chosen to follow up the results in mainly the dimensions of the boarding 
passengers, quality in terms of few canceled trips, high percentage of punctual trips as well 
as perceived quality and costs. There are two main questions for this follow-up.  
•  How are the outcomes in the E20 areas evolving compared with the period before?  
•  How are the outcomes in the E20 areas evolving compared to the comparison areas?  
We do not decide if it the observed changes improve on social welfare or not and we only 
lock to if the contract generates increased travel, better quality or lower costs (a first step 
towards calculating cost per trip or production efficiency, not to be confused with socio-
economic efficiency).  
 
4 Supply   
4.1 Number of departures  
4.1.1 Before and after  
The development of the number of departures differs between the areas. In some contract 
areas, like Bromma no dramatic changes to the monthly average for the number of 
departures are observed after the E20 contract starts. The number of departures increases 
slightly during the first two years after the start of the contract and then decreases somewhat 
year three. In another area, Sollentuna, a more dramatic change occurs. Here, the monthly 
average of the number of departures increased by 92 percent between the year before and 
the year after the contract started. However, this big increase diminished during the two 
following years and returned to previous levels. 
In one of the comparison areas, Södertälje, the increases in supply has been quite even over 
the years, except for 2012, which has a higher monthly average than any other year (the 
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temporary increase was due to bus replacing commuter trains starting in the autumn term of 
2011 and continuing through 2012). Järfälla Upplands-Bro has a similar development.  
4.1.2 E20 contracts compared to comparison areas  
Comparing the E20 and the comparison contracts through average increases in departures 
would be misleading as this would not capture developments that have taken place during 
the three years. One can assume that it will take a few years before the entrepreneur learns 
the market and consequently to adjust its supply to demand by either increasing or 
decreasing the number of departures and routes depending on the response of passengers.  
We therefore compare the percentage change between 2011 and 2015 in the whole E20 
area to the same change in both E13 areas. What we can see is that the number of 
departures has increased by 0.3 percent to 2015 compared with 2011 in the E20 area, while 
the same increase in the E13 area is 16.5 per cent.  
  
4.2 Redistribution of departures  
To get an idea of route changes and changes in frequency, we have read Stockholm region 
RPTA's documentation on traffic change 2012/2013, 2013/2014, 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 
(Traffic Management, 2012; 2013; 2014b; 2015). The information is relatively well in line with 
the changes in supply. Traffic year 2012/2013 is characterized by increased frequencies, no 
major changes during the 2013/2014 traffic year and then reduced frequencies the traffic 
year 2014/2015. For Norrort there is no information on traffic change 2012/2013, when 
"Discussions between SL and Arriva take place regarding change of supply to be 
implemented at the start of the contract" (Stockholm region RPTA 2012, p.78).  
There are some route changes, mainly extensions or shortenings of routes, as well as 
adaptation to new residential areas, workplaces or commercial areas (eg, Friends Arena).  
Construction sites are also a reason for temporary redeployment. Our assessment is that the 
changes in route outline are insufficient to affect demand at the aggregated level.  
 
5 Cancelled departures  
The number of cancelled departures also vary among the E20 areas, even though the 
differences are small. 
 
 
Figure 1 The change in the number of canceled departures for the E20 and E13 areas, 
expressed in percentage points, in 2015 compared with 2011. 
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For E20 contracts there is a greater reduction in the number of cancellations noted than for 
the comparison contracts (Figure 1). The change is from 0.7 percent to 0.1 percent.  For the 
E13 contracts, the outcome changes from 0.4 percent to 0.2 percent.  
 
6 Punctuality  
Punctuality, or timeliness, is measured using the computers in the buses that record 
departures and arrivals. The small change in averages in the E20-areas (Figure 2), with a 
small reduction of punctual departures and a small increase of punctual arrivals. Bromma is 
the only contract area where punctuality improved in both departures and arrivals, while 
punctuality in Solna/Sundbyberg and Norrort deteriorated.   
 
Figure 2 Punctuality of departures and arrivals for all E20, before and after the start of the 
contract. 
The mean changes in proportion punctual departures (Figure 3) or punctual arrivals (Figure 
4) between 2011 and 2015 is an increase in E20 zones while punctuality decreases in the 
area E13. It is difficult to draw any general conclusions regarding punctuality in the E20 
areas. If anything, it has stabilized, that is that the variation in punctuality decreased. 
However, for the E13 area, it appears that there has been a deterioration over the last couple 
of years.  
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Figure 3 The percentage change of punctual departures for the E20 and E13 areas, in 2015 
compared to 2011. 
 
 
Figure 4 The percentage change of punctual arrivals for the E20 and E13 areas, in 2015 
compared with 2011. 
 
7 Experienced quality  
Experienced quality is measured via surveys to passengers aboard every month. The figures 
below show the share of satisfied customers as a percentage. The development in E20 
contract areas deteriorates on average when comparing the years before and the years after 
the start of the contract. This is largely due to the low grades at the beginning of the contract 
period. As seen in Figure 5 the perceived quality recovers at the end of the period and in the 
fall of 2015, the percentage of satisfied customers even rises above any number during the 
period before the contract start.  
 
 
Figure 5 Solna/Sundbyberg. Customer Satisfaction Index (CSI) per term. The figure shows 
the proportion of respondents who answered "satisfied". 
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In a comparison of the CSI "overall grades" between 2011 and 2015 for both the E13- and 
the E20-areas the CSI the results for E13 increases more, by 5.6 percent than the E20's 2.8 
percent. This is most influenced by a large improvement in Södertälje.   
 
 
Figure 6 The percentage change in the proportion of customers who have stated "satisfied" 
as aggregating grades for the E20 and E13 areas, in 2015 compared with 2011. 
 
 8 The number of boarding passengers  
The supply increases more in the E13- than in the E20 areas and the difference is relatively 
large. What has happened to the demand, ie the number of boarding? On average, the total 
number of boardings increased during the contract period by 6 percent in the E20 areas 
compared with the period before. In the comparison areas, the number of boardings during 
the contract period increased by 4 percent.  
However, the variation between the E20 areas and over time in the areas is high. The 
number of passengers boarding increase in all areas, except in Sollentuna where the number 
of passengers boarding decreases slightly. Bromma has the largest increase; the mean 
value increased by 10.5 percent. The corresponding figure for Södertälje is 2 percent.  
Counting the average for the E20 area, the number of boardings per day increased by 
almost 3000 period after compared to before (Figure 7), i.e. 6.3 percent. The corresponding 
change for the E13 is 4.2 percent.  
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Figure 7 The entire E20 area. The average number of work day boardings increases for four 
years before and three years after the start of the contract. 
Above we showed the difference in mean before and after the start of the contract.  
Comparing the number of passengers in 2011 to 2015, the difference is larger for E13 than 
for E20, 5.4 percent and 4.8 percent respectively. The reason that these changes differ from 
above are that in all E20 bus areas, the number of boardings between 2014 and 2015 
decreases. In Järfälla Upplands-Bro and Södertälje, travel continues to increase between 
2014 and 2015.  
 
9 Contract expenditures  
For the four areas E20 costs have decreased in Bromma and Sollentuna, but increased in 
Solna/Sundbyberg and Norrort. The largest change occurred in Sollentuna, where the costs 
for the RPTA were almost halved. For E13 areas, costs have increased about 17-19 percent. 
The contract expenditures increased between 2011 and 2015 with a total of 0.7 percent in 
the E20 areas, while it increased by 15.9 percent in the E13 area (Figure 8). E20 contracts 
seem to have held back the Stockholm region RPTA costs. 
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Figure 8 The percentage changes of Stockholm regions contract expenses (SEK, nominal 
prices) E20- and E13 area in 2015 compared with 2011. 
 
10 Concluding observations and explanations  
10.1 Summary of findings  
If the incentive is large enough to cover the cost of expanded traffic and if demand is 
sufficiently sensitive to supply increases the E20 contracts may lead to increased supply and 
thus an increase in demand. The contracts can also be expected to lead to a reallocation of 
both supply and demand, by moving capacity from routes with low demand to routes with 
higher demand. If the number of passengers increases, so does the costs for the RPTA. 
Overall, the number of departures, calculated as an average number of departures during the 
entire contract period, increased by 16 percent in E20 areas. The variation between E20-
areas and over time in the contract areas, however, is large. In the comparison areas the 
departures, on average, increased by 15 percent. 
If we compare the number of departures only during 2015 to 2011 (as the number of 
departures fell sharply in the period just before the new contracts became effective and the 
number of departures decreased between 2014 and 2015 in E20 areas), we get a different 
picture. Then frequencies only increase slightly in the E20 areas while they increase in the 
comparison areas with 16 percent. In 2015 the incentives do not seem to have been strong 
enough to sustainably stimulate a larger supply increase than would come about with the 
gross cost contracts. 
The documentation we received from the Stockholm region RPTA indicates only small 
reallocation of departures occurs.  
If demand is sufficiently sensitive with respect to the quality and the costs for increasing the 
quality are low, the incentives "should" lead to higher quality. The results suggest that the 
incentives, on average, have a small but positive effect on punctuality and cancellations, and 
over time, a positive effect on perceived quality. During the three years with the E20 contract 
the perceived quality increases and in the last year it is on level with or even above previous 
levels. The effects are small. Effects on punctuality are also small. Our overall assessment is 
that the quality development is positively affected by the E20 contracts. One explanation may 
be that some measures to achieve improved quality have low costs and are therefore carried 
out in the hope that they can affect travel positively. 
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Overall, the number of passengers increased during the contract period by 6 percent in the 
E20 areas compared with the previous period. The variation between the E20 areas and over 
time in the contract areas, however, is large. In the comparison areas the number of 
boardings during the contract period calculated in the same way increased by 4 percent. 
If we compare the number of passengers only in 2015 in 2011, the picture is different. The 
E20 areas, the number of boardings increased by 4 percent, while it increased by 5 percent 
in the comparison areas. 
Compared with the comparison areas cost increases in the sense of the client's contract 
spending are on average less in E20 areas. However, we know nothing about the operator's 
costs, and we therefore do not know if the incentives are sufficient to cover costs at the 
margin to produce more boardings. 
The stated objectives are to increase travel and customer satisfaction and increase 
efficiency. With the use of the chosen indicators the E20 contracts performed better than the 
comparison area gross cost contracts regarding 
• Costs  
• Customer satisfaction, but Initially worse 
• Canceled departures  
• Punctuality  
..but worse in  
•  Departures  
... and not better regarding  
• Boardings  
This comparison is not necessarily representative of the gross cost or incentive contracts in 
general, but concerns the compared contracts. The E20 contracts are not better at increasing 
the number of passengers boarding than the comparison contracts. A troublesome 
observation may be that to the number of boardings decrease in several contract areas in 
2015. It seems as if the strength of the incentives in the E20 contract to increase demand are 
weaker than those that arise in the management of gross cost contracts. However, this is 
only a problem if the goal of the RPTA really is to increase travel. If e.g. supply and travel in 
these areas, are oversized in the starting position, it is not a problem. In this case, it is 
difficult to understand why a contract with the declared aim to increase travel is needed. 
The increase in demand can be compared what the population increase would have 
generated using a Swedish average elasticity of demand with respect to population growth 
for Swedish cities. This is 0.5, which means that an increase in population in cities at 10 
percent everything else being equal, on average, would lead to an increase in the number of 
boardings on buses by 5 percent. The corresponding elasticity of demand with respect to 
supply is 0.7 and with respect to the price -0.4 (in Nilsson et al. 2013). 
Overall, the population increased during the period (2009-2015) in all areas by about 11 
percent. It "should" lead to a trend increase of boardings by about 6 percent. The average 
increase of boardings in the E20 areas was about 12 per cent. But between 2011 and 2015, 
the change in the number of passengers boarding was 5 percent. 
During the periods when the number of departures increases, the number of boardings 
"should" increase if demand is sensitive to the supply increases. Balcombe et al. (2004) 
gives an average short-term demand elasticity with respect to bus supply at 0.38 (page 73). 
They also refer to Dargay and Hanly (1999) and Preston (1998), who find wide variations in 
estimated elasticities. The latter state that the elasticity is often higher in off-peak than in 
peak traffic, which often coincides with the longer the time interval between departures than 
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in the peak hours. If the frequency in the starting mode is 10 minutes or less, this will lead to 
an improvement effects less than if the frequency is 20 minutes. Balcombe et al. (2004) also 
references studies showing that demand responds with a lag, which means that we do not 
know exactly how long the operator (or RPTA) should wait to be sure that the adjustment 
should have time to take place. 
To the extent that the contract leads to an increased number of boarding passengers, this 
would also lead to increased costs. Overall, the Stockholm region RPTA contract expenses 
for E20 increases by 5 percent compared to the previous period. Given an increase in the 
number of boardings by 6 percent this seems reasonable. This proportionality is, however 
not present for all the individual contracts. In the comparison contracts costs increase by 18 
percent. According to the contract officers in the Stockholm region RPTA part of this cost 
increase could be explained by the fact that the Stockholm region RPTA ordered more traffic. 
This difference in cost increases raises several questions. One question is whether the E20-
operator really breaks even? If not, are the incentives strong enough to maintain a service 
compatible with the goals of the Traffic supply program? 
 
10.2 Possible explanations  
A first question is whether the incentive payments may are too low to generate supply and 
thus the demand. As the E20-contracts was a new type of contract, it may have tempted 
bidders to speculate on the potential to attract new passengers and on the costs of doing so. 
If the winning bidder was the provider of the most "optimistic" tender, there is thus the 
possibility that the firm submitting the winning tender underestimated costs and 
overestimated its future income. If so, this would explain the reduction in costs. 
It is also interesting to compare the magnitude of the incentives with optimal incentives 
calculated in previous studies (eg Bekken and Norheim, 2006; Pyddoke and Andersson, 
2010). In these studies - albeit for other areas - we find that the optimal incentives in the 
order of twice the ticket revenue per passenger. This estimate can only be interpreted as a 
rough indication. New estimates of with for example the Urbanet Analyse method (such as in 
Norheim and Kjørstad, 2009) can provide both higher and lower values. In Stockholm, it 
could possibly correspond to an incentive equivalent to around the average cost of a traveler.  
It may be noted that the first tenders of bus services in the early 1990s led to substantial cost 
reductions, but that these cost reductions were later followed by large cost increases. It is of 
course difficult say something about what the counterfactual development could have been 
without a good model. A likely scenario is that continued in house operation of the services 
would also have led to cost increases. General cost increases for wages, vehicles, fuels and 
depots should affect all operators equally. 
One possible explanation for the moderate increase in the supply and number of boarding 
passengers may be that the incentive became too low. The incentive in the second part of 
the contract (Norrort) is higher than in the first part E20 areas. The reason is that it is based 
on a longer average travel length in the second part than in the first part. The outcome of 
Norrort does not differ clearly from other areas. 
A second question is about the freedom of the operator to change the route network. What 
freedom does the operator have, for example, to implement measures to speed up traffic by 
public transport lanes, signal priority, new stops or fewer stops. All these decisions are 
owned by the municipality. The operator can under the contract reallocate capacity between 
the routes by reducing the frequency of one and by increasing it in another. The samples of 
analyses we have made of schedules indicate only small changes in the timetables. No 
quantitative analysis has been made of the schedule changes. Insofar as the old schedules 
stored by the Samtrafiken (an agency responsible for national timetabling) such analysis 
could be made based on these schedules. 
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A third question is whether the contracts inadvertently led to the later desired deceleration of 
the cost.  
A fourth issue is whether it is good or bad that the costs of the E20 contracts increase slower 
than the costs for gross cost contracts. If the slower growth was due to increased efficiency, 
it is good, but if it is caused by slower expansion of supply than desired by the RPTA, then it 
is not good. 
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